


## H1N1: North Carolina Responds

Julie Casani, MD, MPH NC DPH- PHP&R One Medicine- 2009




- April 26Declarat
- Declaration of Public Health
   Emergency

#### First Wave

- Epidemiology
  - Descriptive
  - Develop/Implement Mitigation Strategies
- Laboratory Investigation


#### NC H1N1 Cases by Week of Report



## The First Wave April 24-May 15

- Initial case identification, isolation, laboratory testing, guidance adaptation and development, information sharing, receipt of Strategic National Stockpile
- 8090 total hours of service by over 200 people
- This included staff from the Division of PH, Public Health Regional Surveillance Teams, NC Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services, NC Emergency Management, students from UNC School of Public Health and NCSU College of Veterinary Medicine and other agencies.
- Total costs ~ \$1.9 m in personnel costs, \$160,000 in equipment/non-personnel costs.
- Does not include countless hours and effort at the local level.


#### Staff Levels




### Uniquities

- Call center
- Gov's office
- Lab liaison
- Migrant Workers
- Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)

#### Call Center Volumes



## Lab Specimens Accessioned




- Over 250,000 migrant farm workers come to North Carolina each year; largely from Mexico and Central America.
- NC Growers Association
  - Sponsor 3% from Mexico on H2A visas.
  - Know where the worker is working and where the worker is living.
  - Provided minimal medical screening, information about H1N1 for the workers and the growers and follows the workers for arising health issues.
- The remaining 97% come from a variety of countries through crew chiefs who act as agents.
- Several state agencies "touch" these workers mostly through the crew chiefs but also through the growers:
  - Department of Agriculture
  - Department of Labor
  - Employment Security Commission
  - Cooperative Extensions
- The American Consulate in Mexico closed for visa services until May 15, 2009.

- Coordinated with North Carolina DA&CS, Office of Minority Health and Health Disparities and the Office of Rural Health and Community Care Programs (NC DHHS).
- Provided outreach to growers, community health centers,
   Local Health Departments and other state agencies.
  - Culturally compatible health information in multiple languages and
  - Resources for health care.
- Distributed antiviral medications from the SNS
  - Through Local Health Departments, especially for those that do not have the resources to fill prescriptions at pharmacies.
- Materials regarding evaluation and management of potentially infected people were pushed out to community health centers and other providers.
- Migrant Clinician Network opened its doors to anyone who is ill with influenza-like illness for evaluation and testing.

## Is this a pandemic?

WHO elevated status to Phase 6June 11, 2009

who.int



WHO P	Interpretation	lemi	Pandemi Peri		ert	Pandemic Period			
Phase	1	2	3	4	5	6			

**Inter-Pandemic: New virus in animals, no human cases** 

**Phase 1: Low risk of human cases** 

**Phase 2: Greater risk of human cases** 

**Pandemic Alert: New virus causes human cases** 

Phase 3: No or very limited human-to-human (h-to-h) transmission

Phase 4: Evidence of increased h-to-h transmission

Phase 5: Evidence of significant h-to-h transmission

**Pandemic:** 


Phase 6: Efficient and sustained h-to-h transmission

	Int	ter-								
	Pandem			Pandemic Alert Period						
WHO	ic Period						Pandemic Period			
Phase	1	2		3	4	5	6			
USG Stage	Outl At	Domes nimal oreak i :-Risk ountry		Suspected Human Outbreak Overseas	Confi Hun Outb Over	nan reak	Widesprea d Outbreaks Overseas	Human	Spread Throughout United States	Recovery
Stage		0		1	2	2	3	4	5	6

- 0) New domestic animal outbreak in at-risk country
- 1) Suspected human outbreak overseas
- 2) Confirmed human outbreak overseas
- 3) Widespread outbreaks overseas
- 4) First human case in North America
- 5) Spread throughout the United States
- 6) Recovery and preparation for subsequent waves

	Inter- Pandem ic		Pandemic Perio	Pandemic Period							
WHO Phase	Period 1 2		3 4 5		6						
USG	New Dome Animal Outbreak At-Risk Country	in	Suspected Human Outbreak Overseas	Hu Out	irmed man break rseas	Widesprea d Outbreaks Overseas	Human		ead Throug Jnited State		Recovery
Stage	0		1		2	3	4		5		6
CDC											
Inter val		- /es	tigation		Rec	ognition	Initiation	Accel	Peak	Decel	Resolution

#### **Pandemic Waves**




Weekly combined influenza and pneumonia mortality, United Kingdom, 1918–1919.

-JK Taubenberger and DM Morens. 1918 Influenza: the Mother of All Pandemics. EID, Jan. 2006

	Pandemic Severity Index				
Interventions* by Setting	1	2 and 3	4 and 5		
Home Voluntary isolation of ill at home (adults and children); combine with use of antiviral treatment as available and indicated	Recommend†§	Recommend†§	Recommend†§		
Voluntary quarantine of household members in homes with ill persons¶ (adults and children); consider combining with antiviral prophylaxis if effective, feasible, and quantities sufficient	Generally not recommended	Consider**	Recommend**		
School Child social distancing					
-dismissal of students from schools and school based activities, and closure of child care programs	Generally not recommended	Consider: ≤4 weeks††	Recommend: ≤12 weeks§§		
-reduce out-of-school social contacts and community mixing	Generally not recommended	Consider: ≤4 weeks††	Recommend: ≤12 weeks§§		
Workplace / Community Adult social distancing -decrease number of social contacts (e.g., encourage teleconferences, alternatives to face-to-face meetings)	Generally not recommended	Consider	Recommend		
-increase distance between persons (e.g., reduce density in public transit, workplace)	Generally not recommended	Consider	Recommend		
-modify postpone, or cancel selected public gatherings to promote social distance (e.g., postpone indoor stadium events, theatre performances)	Generally not recommended	Consider	Recommend		
-modify work place schedules and practices (e.g., telework, staggered shifts)	Generally not recommended	Consider	Recommend		

#### **CDC** Interval




#### Second Wave

- Re-congregation of primary risk group, primary reservoir and primary vectors
  - Students!
- Stood up Incident Management Team in DPH on September 15.
- Stood up SERT H1N1 committee the next week.


#### Second Wave


- Mitigation
  - Vaccination
  - Community measures
  - PPE
- Surveillance
  - Measure outcomes of mitigation
  - Scope
- Response related to scope

## Hospitals










#### **PPE and Antiviral Medications**

Trauma Region Nov 4, 2009	N95: Small	N95: Reg	Oseltamivir (Tamiflu)	Zanamivir (Relenza)
Capital	3075	7550	63092	1551
Duke	1465	2565	1973	563
Eastern	9668	30232	30141	2167
Metrolina	2937	9866	17545	11
Mid-Carolina	11973	11393	4784	725
Mountain Area	4162	8185	1845	130
Southeastern	4558	30247	12972	288
Triad	13857	13364	9132	499
Totals	51695	113402	141484	5934

#### **Statewide PPE and Antiviral Medications**

Statewide November-December, 2009



## Utilization of Scarce Resources

- NC IOM report on ethics (2007)
- NC Medical Society Committee
- Background of NY State and US Veterans
   Affairs plans
- Overall most plans attempt to predict mortality using accepted multi-organ system failure scales
- Findings:
  - Most patients critically ill did not have multiorgan system failure
  - "rate limiting" resource was ECMO

# Pandemic Mitigation Strategies

- Nonpharmaceutical interventions
  - Hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette
  - Isolation and quarantine
  - Social distancing (school dismissal, cancellation of large gatherings, teleworking, etc.)
- Vaccination
- Targeted antiviral treatment and prophylaxis

## Pandemic Mitigation Strategies

- Mitigation strategies guided by severity of illness
  - H1N1 2009 had mortality rate of ~0.3%-0.5%
- Guidance issued for specific settings
  - Schools
  - Camps
  - Workplace
  - Health care facilities
  - Long-term care facilities

### H1N1 Vaccine Strategy

- Use of providers as surge capacity and to reach target groups
- LAIV vs multi-dose vials vs single dose pre-filled syringes
- Mulitiple manufacturers with multiple lciensing issues
- Roll out

# Pandemic Vaccine: **Target** Groups

- Pregnant women
- People who live with or care for children younger than 6 months of age
- Health care and emergency medical services workers
- Persons 6 months through 24 years of age
- People 25 through 64 years of age at high risk for complications of influenza

#### H1N1 Pandemic Vaccination

- Medical Risk Model NOT
   Infrastructure Protection Model
- Target Groups NOT Priority Groups
- Would predictably reach a point where demand from target groups is met and then would be opening to the general public